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THE SAD STORY OF SUPERBILL, OR WHAT HAPPENED TO THE
INDIANA CODE OF 1971?
REED DICKERSON*
Introduction
A fascinating, though disturbing, example of the judiciary's
general difficulty in dealing with statutory and similar materials appeared
in the Indiana supreme court's recent opinion in State of Indiana ex rel.
Pearcy v. Criminal Court of Marion County.' In this case, the supreme
court invalidated the Indiana Code of 1971, popularly known as Super-
bill, in the course of declaring unconstitutional an amendment to Super-
bill that violated the state constitution's "one-subject" requirement.! By
enacting Superbill as a prelude to a thoroughgoing revision, the General
Assembly had tried to provide a reliable and comprehensive statement of
currently effective statute law to serve as a legislative base.
The facts of the case may be stated briefly. One Newman, who had
been convicted of first degree burglary, asked to be credited with time
previously served in jail or prison with respect to both the burglary and
his previous offenses. He claimed under Public Law 155 of the Acts
of 1971, in which the Indiana General Assembly had undertaken to
amend the pertinent provision of Superbill, enacted several months
before. The court struck down Public Law 155 because it covered two
inadequately connected subjects. It said, "There is no apparent relation
between the subject of prison officials and employees and the subject of
the length and diminution of sentences of convicts, and none is disclosed
in either the title or body of Public Law 155."'
So far, so good. If the opinion had stopped there, no one other
than Newman could have complained. Unfortunately, it did not. The
court reasoned that, despite its form, Public Law 155 had amended not
Superbill but its relevant source laws. It reached this conclusion by
finding that Superbill was not a "codification" but a mere editorial
(however official) "compilation" and as such could not replace the laws
on which it was based, even though it purported to repeal them.'
Superbill's failure to replace its source laws, the court also reasoned,
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington).
1. 274 N.E.2d 519 (Ind. 1971).
2. IND. CONST. art. 4, § 19.
3. 274 N.E.2d at 522.
4. Id.
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resulted at least partly from the fact that, not being an original enactment
of a "codification," it fell outside the constitutional exception for such
enactments and thus under the constitutional ban on statutes covering
more than one subject.5 And so Superbill became an incidental casualty
of the court's invalidation of Public Law 155.
The opinion caused widespread consternation among both members
of the General Assembly and members of the bar. The bases for question-
ing the soundness of the court's action appear with respect to the proce-
dural context in which the specific issue involving Superbill was resolved,
the sensitive relationship between the judicial branch and the legislative
branch, the court's reading of the constitution, its reading of Superbill,
the internal coherence of its opinion, and the relevance of Superbill's
validity to the validity of Public Law 155.
The Procedural Context
The fact that the case went to the Indiana supreme court on a writ
of mandate, rather than by the normal appeal route, may have conditioned
the result. The writ approach appears to have reflected the apparent
urgency of the matter, which in turn resulted from the trial court's
rather extravagant reading of Public Law 155: that the statute allowed
credit for prior incarceration not only for the immediate crime but also
for earlier ones. This would have allowed criminals to "bank" prison
credit without limit, with the result that a discharged prisoner with,
say, three years' prison credit could commit with impunity any crime
not involving a longer term.
The supreme court apparently did not question the trial court's
reading of Public Law 155. Should it have done so? It is arguable that
the point was moot, because even a more reasonable interpretation (that
a criminal's right to be credited with prior incarceration was limited to
that occasioned by the immediate crime) would not have immunized the
statute from the constitution's ban on multiple subjects. On the other
hand, the possibility of a more reasonable interpretation might well have
justified the supreme court in reinterpreting Public Law 155, denying
the writ, and allowing the prosecuting attorney to seek review in the
more deliberate climate of an appeal.
In presenting its case to the supreme court, neither party briefed or
argued the validity of Superbill. Apparently the point was raised by the
court on its own initiative during its search for an appropriate rationale.
5. Id. "... [A]li enactments, other than original enactments of codifications as
defined by this opinion, must satisfy the title and single subject matter requirements set
forth in . . . Art. 4, § 19."
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Only the two counsel for the relator were present at the argument, and
their participation in the consideration of the issue was limited to
answering several general questions put by the court concerning the
character of Superbill as a "codification" or "compilation," the relevance
of which was not immediately apparent to them and for which they had
no opportunity to be specifically prepared. Accordingly, the court arrived
at its conclusion without benefit of an adequate adversary briefing on
the issue of Superbill's validity.
No one questions the authority of the supreme court to adopt any
approach that makes sense to it. What one may question is a judicial
judgment that chooses to decide a question of this magnitude, especially
one that involves a potential setback for a co-equal branch of government
on a matter of serious concern to it, without calling on resources adequate
to guard against significant risks of error.
Hearing rumblings of dissatisfaction with its opinion as originally
filed,' the court reconsidered its views, without benefit of argument,
in the light of a brief from an amicus curiae representing Phillip H.
Gutman, President Pro Tem of the Indiana State Senate and Chairman
of the Indiana Code Revision Commission.
The Governmental Context
Even granting that no one, not even Senator Gutman, had legal
standing to demand reconsideration and that reopening the matter was
solely an act of judicial grace, one may wonder whether the court took
the most prudent course when it chose not to solicit additional advice.
Although it accepted some of the suggestions in the brief of amicus
curiae, it ultimately adopted a second-choice proposal that preserved
Superbill's "citability" without preserving its validity as the definitive
expression of Indiana law.'
Although, in hindsight, amicus curiae might be criticized for not
pressing more strongly his first-choice alternative (to validate Superbill
as the definitive expression of Indiana law), he must be credited with a
more sensitive awareness of the need for the legislature to be deferential
to a sister branch of the government than the supreme court showed
with respect to the legislative branch. That this duty of deference might
have led amicus curiae to pull his forensic punches was a contingency
perceivable by the court. Certainly, in view of the almost universal
professional dissent, the sensitivity of the matter could hardly have been
overlooked.
6. On September 24, 1971.
7. Id.
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None of this argues that the supreme court's rationale was wrong.
It only suggests that the court needlessly risked affronting the General
Assembly and handicapping the Indiana bar. Unfortunately, there is
reason to believe that the supreme court's rationale was indeed wrong
and that at least some damage to the General Assembly's and the public's
aspirations has resulted.
Meaning of the Constitution
Article 4, section 19 of the Indiana constitution provides as follows:
Every act, amendatory act or amendment of a code shall embrace
but one subject and matters properly connected therewith; which
subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall
be embraced in an act, amendatory act or amendment of a code,
which shall not be expressed in the title, such act, amendatory
act or amendment of a code shall be void only as to so much
thereof as shall not be expressed in the title. The requirements
of this paragraph shall not apply to original enactments of
codifications of laws.
Every amendatory act and every amendment of a code shall
identify the original act or code, as last amended, and the sections
or subsections amended shall be set forth and published at full
length. The identification required by this paragraph may be
made by citation reference.'
If this section means what it says, Superbill offended the con-
stitution only if Superbill (1) covered more than one subject or in-
adequately reflected its subject in its title and (2) fell outside the
exception for "original enactments of codifications." Thus, an enactment
would seem to avoid the reach of article 4, section 19, merely by being
an original "codification." The supreme court, however, thought other-
wise:
The [exception] has reference to single subjects which are en-
acted from time to time as "original enactments" and which
contain in a codified form matters properly connected to that
single general subject.9
The court supported this conclusion by citing the constitutionality
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
and the Probate Code, each one of which, it said, dealt with a single
subject and resulted from:
8. As amended November 8, 1960.
9. 274 N.E.2d at 521 (emphasis in original). Did the court read "shall not apply"
(emphasis added), in the exception provision, as "shall apply"?
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• . . a commission study . . . culminating in the proposed en-
actment of a particular code containing all the pre-existing laws
pertaining to such a single subject.1"
In brief, the court's analysis rests on three propositions: (1)
Superbill was not a "code," because it was evolved by the process of
mere compilation; 1 (2) Superbill was unconstitutional, because unlike
the Uniform Commercial Code, it was not confined to "one subject ;12
(3) to comply with the constitution, Superbill must both be a code and
deal with a single subject.
The court deserves credit for attempting an honest exegesis of the
constitutional text, especially in an era in which courts tend to read
constitutional or statutory text only over the shoulders of other or
earlier courts. Beyond that, there may be less reason for enthusiasm.
The court's first error lay in its apparent misunderstanding of the
Uniform Commercial Code and its fellows. Far from "containing [i.e.,
codifying] all the pre-existing laws pertaining to such single subjects,"
each of those codes was a product of comprehensive substantive revision
that could not be said to reflect all the pertinent pre-existing laws.
The court's second error, which will be more fully discussed later,
was in assuming, contrary to normal legislative understanding, that the
term "codification" (referring to a code of laws) is coextensive with the
term "codification process" (referring to a means by which a code may
be developed). Indeed, it is not.
Even if we accepted, for the moment, the court's assumption that the
character of the end product as a "code" depends on the process by
which it was evolved, those acts would not be "codifications" (revisions
without significant substantive change) but "substantive statutory re-
visions." On the other hand, if the constitution's exception for "original
codifications" includes not only codes resulting from the process of
codification but also those resulting from the process of substantive
statutory revision, what is the basis for not also including codes resulting
from the process of compilation? Certainly, the fact that the constitu-
tion's exception includes codes resulting from two of the three processes
does not necessarily create the negative implication that it excludes acts
resulting from the third.
Conversely, if comprehensive acts resulting from the process of
compilation are excluded because they do not result from the process of
10. Id.
11. Id. at 522.
12. Although the court did not expressly find Superbill to be "unconstitutional," its
reasoning is compatible with no other result.
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codification, what basis was there for the court to include acts such as
the Uniform Commercial Code, which resulted from the process of
substantive statutory revision? If the answer is "none," these acts would
likewise be unconstitutional. The inconsistency is resolved with less
harsh results if all such comprehensive unified enactments are considered
to be constitutional codes regardless of the process by which they were
respectively evolved.
In talking about "codifications" rather than "codes" (terms that the
court apparently treats as synonymous), were the authors of the con-
stitution's exception talking about the process by which statutory results
were arrived at or about the statutory results? Either way, the court was
inconsistent in including two types of "codifications" and excluding the
third. Although the court might have escaped from this inconsistency by
holding that because it alone blanketed the whole field of state law,
Superbill alone ran afoul of the requirement of "one subject," it would
have meant abandoning the court's assumption that Superbill was not a
"codification."
On the other hand, if we accepted the court's dubious assumption that
a comprehensive enactment must be both a codification and confined to
one subject,"3 what purpose would the exception serve? A statute that
deals with a single subject properly reflected in the title does not need an
exception; it already complies with the constitutional requirement to which
the exception applies. Or was the only purpose of the exception to save
codifications with inadequate titles? The authors of the exception did not
so restrict it.
Moreover, to contend that the constitution covers the limited cod-
ification while excluding the comprehensive one seems to imply that the
narrower the scope of a codification the greater claim it has to con-
stitutionality. If so, at what point would the narrow "codification" end
and the ordinary enactment begin? It would seem more plausible to
assume that the broader a statute's coverage the more it assumes the
features of a codification. If, on the other hand, the constitution means
what it plainly says, an original enactment of a codification need not be
restricted to a single subject, and it may not need even an adequate title.
The court took special comfort in the fact that the 1960 amendment
to section 19, which added the exception, couched it in the plural at the
same time that it added to the subject of the first sentence ("Every act")
two additional subjects ("amendatory act or amendment of a Code")
couched in the singular. 4 The contrast is hardly significant, because it
13. See text at note 8 supra.
14. 274 N.E.2d at 521.
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is a common (though often undesirable) practice to draft in the plural,
and because the use of the singular for the added subjects can be
explained simply on the ground that the original subject was already
in the singular. The contrast is ultimately irrelevant, because at best it
only reinforces the assumption that when the authors of the amendment
used the plural they meant the plural. The question then arises, "So
what?"
Let us conclude, as the court does, that in using the plural the
authors were telling us that they intended to include a plurality of
codes dealing with areas of limited scope. Although this is undoubtedly
so, it does not imply that they also intended to exclude a comprehensive
code; there is not even the minimum basis here for a negative implica-
tion. Including such a code is fully compatible with the notion of plurality;
it even furthers it. Also, the plural form is consistent even with an
intention to cover only Superbill's kind of code, because over the long
haul there could be a succession of such codes.
In holding that Superbill did not constitute an original enactment
of a codification, the court said that it was, instead, a comprehensive
"compilation"' 5 like Burns Indiana Statutes Annotated, except that
Superbill is official whereas Burns is not. This approach gives Superbill
the same legal status as the unenacted provisions of the current United
States Code, which comprise an official editorial compilation of the federal
laws published by the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
House of Representatives. It is thus official without being definitive. The
court's analysis overlooks the important fact that whereas its federal
counterpart remains unenacted, Superbill was enacted. The court was
undoubtedly misled by the fact that every other compilation known to it
had in fact been unenacted.
An earlier congressional enactment might seem to be precedent for
the court's apparent assumption that a compilation is inherently incapable
of replacing its source laws even if it is enacted. Although in 1926
Congress enacted the United States Code, which likewise failed to
supplant the source laws that it restated, that enactment contained a
special provision, not found in Superbill, that the Code was intended
to be only "prima facie evidence of the law."'" It was only this provision
and the absence of a general repealer that prevented the 1926 Code
from replacing the laws on which it was based.
Compare Superbill. Here, the Indiana General Assembly made
15. Id. at 522.
16. Act of June 30, 1926, ch. 712, § 2(a), 44 Stat. 1.
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clear that it intended to enact a definitive statement of Indiana law and
to repeal the source laws on which it was based. With specific exceptions,
Superbill repealed "all acts enacted prior to the 1971 session of the
General Assembly."' 7 Section 1-1-1-5, providing that Superbill was in-
tended to be a continuation of the laws that it restated, was included only
to provide substantive continuity from the old to the new. It was intended
to forestall any contention that Superbill represented a substantive break
with the past, which might create problems of unfair surprise. It was
framed on the assumption that, although the source laws were no
longer in effect, the substance of what they expressed continued uninter-
rupted.
In calling Superbill a mere "compilation," the court confused the
end result of codification with the process of compilation by which the
legislature created it. The status of a law as a "code" is not determined by
the process by which it was evolved. Black's Law Dictionary defines a
code as "A collection, compendium or revision of laws . . . . A com-
plete system of positive laws, scientifically arranged, and promulgated
[i.e., enacted] by legislative authority."' Superbill is such a "collection
of laws," "scientifically arranged" and "promulgated . . . by
legislative authority." This appears to reflect the common understanding
of the term "code" that the authors of the constitution presumably had in
mind. Black defines "codification" as the process involved in developing
a code, 9 and this may have misled the court into concluding that the
authors of the constitutional amendment were more interested in legisla-
tive processes than they were in legislative results, even though the con-
text makes reasonably clear that the opposite was true.
On the other hand, Black defines "compilation" as a "literary
production composed of the works of others and arranged in a methodical
manner.""0 Nothing is said about enactment or non-enactment. In any
event, the fact that a scientifically arranged compendium of laws has
been created by the process of compilation does not prevent it from
becoming a code or codification, if it is then "promulgated by legislative
authority."'" Thus, what was merely a compilation before enactment
became a code or "codification" in the accepted sense as a result of
enactment.
Even assuming that Superbill was not an "original enactment
17. IND. CODE § 1-1-1-2 (1971).
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 323 (4th ed. 1968).
19. Id. at 324.
20. Id. at 356.
21. 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 3702, at 250 (Horack ed. 1943).
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of a codification" covered by the exception, the question still remains
whether it offended the basic requirements of article 4, section 19. Did
it deal with only one subject? If so, was that subject adequately
reflected in the title ?
The court pointed out, "An examination of the Indiana 'Code' of
1971 readily reveals that it contains a multitude of widely varying sub-
jects."22 In one sense, this is incontestable; a statute that deals with all
topics necessarily deals with more than one. Underlying this is the more
difficult question, what is "one subject"? Philosophically, this can be
a highly sophisticated problem. Fortunately, factors inherent in the
problem suggest that the one-subject rule requires only that each Indiana
statute be confined to a functionally integrated problem. The constitution
itself is specific: ". . . shall embrace but one subject and matters
properly connected therewith."' 2
Even if it is only an enacted "compilation," Superbill does not
necessarily offend the constitution. As to whether it deals with only
one subject, it is arguable that, if the whole field of Indiana commercial
law as covered by the Uniform Commercial Code can be called "one
subject," it does not strain credulity to suggest that the objective of
bringing together the whole field of Indiana law can be considered one
subject, especially in a statute that (unlike the Uniform Commercial
Code) makes no substantive change and can, therefore, be realistically
considered to have the simple, single thrust of consolidation."' With this
as the unified core, each reenacted provision becomes a matter "properly
connected therewith."
"Finding no ambiguities" in section 19 of article 4, the court found
it unnecessary to look at case law in other states.25
The supreme court's most fundamental error in dealing with the
one-subject requirement was its failure to give appropriate weight to
the single most important principle for interpreting constitutions, statutes,
and other legal documents: A court should read a document in the
light of its purpose as revealed by its language when read in appropriate
context.
22. 274 N.E.2d at 522.
23. See text at note 8 supra (emphasis added).
24. "If there is any reasonable basis for grouping the various matters together, and
the public will not be deceived, the act will be sustained." 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 1711, at 304 (Horack ed. 1943). ". . . [A] fair interpretation of the
meaning of a single subject for purpose of code revision includes all of the topics which
encompass the existing law of the state." 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
3707, at 253 (Horack ed. 1943).
25. 274 N.E.2d at 522.
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In the light of what seems to be the obvious purpose of section 19,
the supreme court's opinion fails to make adequate sense.
It is well-known that the purpose of state one-subject requirements
is to strike at the abuses of legislative riders, in which extraneous leg-
islative provisions that would otherwise be hard to sell to individual
legislators are tacked onto bills considered to be generally attractive. 2 A
bill with such a rider is a tie-in arrangement in which the individual
legislator is unreasonably induced to vote for something that he would
otherwise reject. The abuse, however, arises only where the provisions
in question make substantive changes in the law. No such change was
made in Superbill. In it the danger of a legislative tie-in did not and
could not exist.
The purpose of the title requirement is simply to require the
legislature to label its products for what they are. There seems to be little
basis for faulting the title of Superbill ("An Act to enact the Indiana
Code of 1971"), which decently describes what the Indiana General
Assembly was trying to do: enact a general statement of Indiana's
statutory law."
Assuming that the purposes of the two requirements have been
accurately stated, it would seem absurd to read the Indiana constitution
as intended to validate, on the one hand, a thoroughgoing revision of
a substantial area of Indiana law28 (which, with or without substantive
changes, would involve far more radical changes and, with substantive
changes, might carry some threat of legislative tie-ins) and to invalidate,
on the other, a modest rearrangement and renactment (in which the
danger at which the constitutional requirement was aimed was non-
existent). Even under the "plain meaning rule" there is no requirement
that a literal reading be followed to the point of absurdity.
The Meaning of Superbill
The court's holding rests not only on a misreading of the con-
stitution but on a misreading of Superbill itself. The court said that
Superbill purported to do no more than "compile," and thus did not
purport to replace its source law. Despite the repeal clause already referred
to, the court interpreted Superbill as recognizing its own lesser status
26. Manson, The Drafting of Statute Titles, 10 IND. L.J. 155 (1934) ; Ruud, No
Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject, 42 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1958).
27. Widney v. Hess, 242 Iowa 342, 348, 45 N.W.2d 233, 237 (1950) ; State v. Czar-
nicki, 124 N.J.L. 43, 45, 10 A.2d 461, 462 (1940); Chumbley v. People's Bank &
Trust Co., 166 Tenn. 35, 42, 60 S.W.2d 164, 166 (1933).
28. E.g., the UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE.
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as a compilation through "continuous reference therein to 'Source,' "29
to identify its respective source laws. How the court arrived at this
conclusion it does not explain. It merely says that the use of this device
shows that the " 'code' recognized that each of its provisions is dependent
upon some Act of the Indiana General Assembly."8 "Dependent upon
some Act" for what? For its legal force? Or merely to show its con-
tinuity with the predecessor source law?
The court's evaluation seems at variance with what is now accepted
as a routine part of codification. In all statutory codifications it is
customary to include at least an editorial reference to each relevant
provision of source law to guide the researcher to the text of the earlier
law, especially where the new law turns out to be ambiguous, vague, or
otherwise uncertain." In no wise does it imply that the new law was not
intended to replace the old.
A Look at Legislative Purpose
There was little or no precedent for Superbill, because as with the
current United States Code the normal codification procedure has been
to take the respective title areas one by one and thoroughly revise them,
using as a base not the text of the unenacted editorial compilation but the
text of the relevant source laws.
Why did Superbill depart from accepted codification practice by
contemplating a two-step, instead of the usual one-step, approach?
Indiana's Statute Revision Commission, which perceived the special need
for Superbill, was trying to meet the almost unique problem created by
the supreme court's earlier reading of the Indiana constitution as it
existed before the amendments of 1960.2 The extraordinarily long titles
of amendatory statutes that that reading produced finally induced legis-
lative draftsmen to avoid in many instances the patent absurdity of 17-
page titles for 5-page bills " by substituting the inconsistent-statute
approach for that of express amendment or repeal. In most fields, the
29. 274 N.E.2d at 522.
30. Id.
31. E.g., U.S.C., tit. 10.
32. The key cases were Draper v. Folley, 33 Ind. 465 (1870), and Feibleman v.
State, 98 Ind. 516 (1884). See Note, "Constitutional" Limitations on Amendments in
Indiana, 28 Ind. L.J. 65 (1952) :
The rule in Draper v. Folley makes every amendment after the first an amend-
ment to an amendment and the Feibleman rule requires that the title of the
act to be amended to be set forth in full. Thus, the titles of amendatory acts in
Indiana necessarily increase in such proportions that they are virtually impos-
sible to understand, thereby nullifying the spirit of Section 19 of the constitution.
Id. at 72.
33. E.g., Ch. 315, [1959] Ind. Acts 797.
260
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ultimate result of amending or repealing by implication was a welter of
overlapping legislative expressions of live law, dead law, and various
combinations of both.
Superbill's main purpose, therefore, was to sweep away the resulting
legislative debris and provide for the first time a single, unified state-
ment of existing law. It adopted what was in effect a cut-and-paste
method, because from the first Superbill envisaged a second phase in
which a thoroughgoing revision of language could be done title by title,
working from a solid legislative base rather than one resting on
statutory quicksand. Thus, in reading a provision that was designed for
a wholly different purpose in a way that prevented the General Assembly
from doing in two steps what it clearly could have done (had it been
feasible) in one, the court was reading the Indiana constitution with
crippling literalness.
Throwing the General Assembly a Bone
The court took some of the sting out of its opinion by holding that,
despite its other inadequacies, Superbill might be cited, instead of its
respective source laws, in meeting the citation requirement of the second
paragraph of section 19 of article 4,4 providing,
Every amendatory act and every amendment of a code shall
identify the original act or code, as last amended . . .. The
identification . . . may be made by citation reference."
The court then said, "By such interpretation and construction of
Art. 4, § 19, we give full meaning to each and every provision thereof,
as well as preserve the efficacy of the Indiana Compilation."' "a Does this
mean that despite its unconstitutionality Superbill is at least partly
valid? If so, how can a law whose constitutional inadequacies taint its
every provision be valid in any sense?
Assuming, instead, that by "efficacy" the court meant the efficacy
of Superbill merely as a compilation, what has the court preserved?
Apparently, it first demoted Superbill from a codification to a mere com-
pilation and then said that it has all the advantages of the status to which
it has been demoted.
Does the court's language mean that Superbill is to be accorded some
34. 274 N.E.2d at 522.
35. If Superbill is invalid, can it be the "original act or Code" referred to by
section 19? Assuming that it cannot, is the court saying that a citation reference to
Superbill is synonymous with a citation reference to the original act or code, i.e., the
source law?
36. 274 N.E.2d at 522.
INDIANA LEGAL FORUM
advantage that is denied Indiana's other compilation, Burns Indiana
Statutes Annotated? Would the court uphold an identification made by
citation reference to that compilation ? If so, the court has preserved noth-
ing that would not inhere in any reliable compilation. If not, the court has
merely proclaimed Superbill's "officiality" while denying its constitu-
tionality. The long-run advantage is marginal.
The whole point of enacting Superbill was to give it something no
mere compilation has-reliability as a definitive statement of statutory
law. The reader of a mere compilation can never be sure that even its
clearest provisions are accurate and, in the case of a discrepancy, the
source law necessarily prevails.
The effective codification, on the other hand, is proof against dis-
crepancy, because it is, at least in its enrolled form, the source law.
Although this is a far greater advantage than mere citability, it is the
benefit that the supreme court has denied to Superbill. As a result, in
any important case the prudent lawyer must now go back to the source
law, as it must with Burns, even where Superbill is crystal clear. The
disadvantage may become monumental when the state gets around to a
full-dress codification of each of the areas respectively represented by the
titles of Superbill. In each case it would normally be necessary to trace
the new text to the text of the source statutes, not the corresponding
text of Superbill.
Even the preservation of citability, without more, may not be an
unqualified advantage. Although legislators need not go behind Super-
bill for the purpose of citing the subject of an amendment, they may
have to search source law to see that the substituted language fits the
form of the source law. After all, that, rather than Superbill, is the law,
and the new piece, it would seem, must fit with the old. Although the
form of the source law may have been only occasionally changed in
Superbill, it was changed often enough to plant a nagging uncertainty
in the mind of the conscientious legislator or legislative draftsman.
Preserving Superbill's citability has, of course, saved the General
Assembly and the court from having to face the unconstitutionality of
all legislation enacted in the 1971 session. But what significant future
advantage can it claim?
37. And why not? If a technically wrong, but still understandable, reference is
valid in the one case, why not in the other?
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Was the Court's Rationale Necessary?
Was so drastic an approach necessary to discharge the court's
judicial responsibility? The issue immediately before it was the validity
of Public Law 155, not the validity of Superbill. Because of the con-
stitutional deference owed by each basic branch to its sister branches, there
is a wholesome presumption of constitutionality. Thus, a court should
hold a state statute unconstitutional only after giving it the benefit of every
reasonable doubt." This is true of Public Law 155. It is especially true of
Superbill, whose invalidation could seriously handicap Indiana's efforts to
consolidate, reorganize, and update its vast array of statutes and seems
likely to impede the legal profession's practical access to Indiana's statute
law.
How was Superbill relevant, if at all, to the question whether Public
Law 155 dealt with two inadequately related subjects? Why did the
supreme court consider it necessary to "pierce" Superbill? "Public
Law 155 is clearly double and embraces two subjects which are
not properly connected."8 Agreed. But would this be any less true if
that act were considered as having amended Superbill instead of one of
its source laws? The true test of Public Law 155's constitutionality would
seem to be the plural nature of Public Law 155, not the plural nature
of the act that it amended. If so, was it not a matter of indifference
whether Public Law 155 amended Superbill or one of its source laws?
It might not have been a matter of indifference had the only basis
for upsetting Public Law 155 been that it fell outside the title of the law
that it amended.4" Thus, if the title of the 1857 law41 that was the source
for section 11-2-1-1 of Superbill, which Public Law 155 amended, was
originally too narrow to accommodate the amendment, the defect would
probably have been cured42 by the more inclusive title of Superbill (had
38. See 1 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1706, at 295 (Horack ed.
1943). Albert v. Milk Control Bd. of Indiana, 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E. 688 (1936) ; Hen-
derson v. London & Lancashire Insurance Co., 135 Ind. 23, 34 N.E. 565 (1893).
39. 274 N.E.2d at 522.
40. Before the 1960 amendment to IND. CONST. art. 4, § 19, if the title of the act
being amended was too narrow to accommodate the subject of the amendatory act, the
title, too, had to be amended. Smith v. State, 194 Ind. 686, 144 N.E. 471 (1924).
41. Ch. 56, § 6, [1857] Ind. Acts. "AN ACT to provide for the government and
discipline of the State Prison and to repeal 'An act to provide for the government
discipline of the State Prison,' approved March 3, 1855, and all other laws or parts of
laws inconsistent herewith."
42. The cases are collected in 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 274 b(2) (1955). Such a cure,
however, would probably not extend to violations of the one-subject requirement. If so,
there was no need to pierce Superbill, even if Public Law 155 was constitutionally
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the latter been validily enacted), and Superbill thus stood in the way.
But if that were the only way to invalidate Public Law 155, why
would the court want to invalidate that law if the only reason it had to do
so was a constitutional defect that was fully cured if Superbill was valid?
This strongly suggests that the court would have had to have another
reason for invalidating Public Law 155. Did the court dislike the policy
that the act, as read by the trial court, expressed? It could have plausibly
reduced Public Law 155 to reasonable size simply by reading it as apply-
ing only to the current offense. Did Public Law 155 offend the constitu-
tion for a substantive reason? The court could have declared it invalid
on that ground. Certainly, mere disagreement with legislative policy
would hardly justify judicial invalidation.
However, the court disavowed the title approach:
Since the time of the 1960 amendment . . . , there is no re-
quirement that the subject matter of the amendatory act be ex-
pressed in the title of the original act, but only in the title to the
amendatory act itself.4"
Instead, it relied on a criterion of relevance to support its main
determination that the one-subject requirement had been violated:
. . . it is . . . necessary that the amendatory language bear
some relationship to the subject of the section amended.4"
But if relevance rather than title was the criterion, the 1857 source law
was no more vulnerable to attack on this ground than Superbill and, thus,
it offered no better basis for invalidating Public Law 155.
What occasion, then, to invalidate Superbill?
Where Do We Go From Here?
What will be the practical effect of Superbill's invalidation as the
definitive statement of Indiana's statute law ?
Just as Burns has been subject to, challenge or doubt, Superbill's
invalidity can potentially make a difference because of the continuing
possibility that it deviates in unknown respects from its source laws. In
the course of preparing Superbill enough errors were found in Burns
to suggest that perfection is hard to come by and that even Superbill
may not be error-free. By its invalidation, therefore, Superbill's reliability
as a statement of Indiana law has been wholly destroyed. How heavy a
required to come within the title of Acts, 1857, ch. 6. By stating the original provisions
of the section of the 1857 law and then adding to them by amendment nonrelated pro-
visions, Public Law 155 violated the one-subject requirement and was invalid on
that account, even if Superbill was wholly valid.
43. 274 N.E.2d at 523.
44. Id.
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burden of extra effort and expense this will impose on the bar would be
hard to measure. Fortunately, the practical impact of the court's decision
will lessen in proportion to the willingness of Indiana courts to accept
Superbill, like Burns, as an accurate statement of the law. (This approach
will remain available only if Superbill is recompiled as its source laws are
successively amended.) On the other hand, in case of specific challenge
and demonstrated discrepancy, the court will have to side with the
session law or the corresponding enrolled bill.
Although Superbill's legislative citability has some value, it should
not be overestimated. Some changes in wording were made in Superbill,
and it may be theoretically necessary to couch some amendments in
terms of the old, not the new, format. Or will the General Assembly be
willing to frame the text of specific amendments following the format of
Superbill, even where that of the source law may be different?
If the General Assembly purports to amend Superbill, the court's
opinion reassures us that the result will not offend the constitution. But
will that approach confer piecemeal constitutional validity on Superbill,
or will the amendment, while referring to Superbill, be read as amending
only the source law? (Would this be the same as amending Burns instead
of the source law?) The answer is not entirely clear.
The most important unresolved question relates to the future useful-
ness of Superbill for serving its main function-providing a solid leg-
islative basis for conducting future, more adequate codifications of the
respective substantive areas represented by its 35 titles.
One member of the General Assembly was heard to remark that
the best way for it to respond to the court's decision would be to ignore
it. Although, taken literally, this might seem inappropriate, there is one
sense in which the General Assembly could legitimately approximate such
an approach without, however, defying the court. It could quite properly
revise the language of each title on the possibly fictitious assumption that
it is an accurate expression of current law as embodied in the source laws.
In this way it could gain the same practical advantage that Superbill,
if legally valid, would have immediately provided. The only risk would
be that in the case of a discrepancy between Superbill and one of its
source laws, the general assembly might make a substantive change
without knowing" it. Fortunately, the risk would be insignificant in
view of the fact that the General Assembly has already accepted it by
enacting Superbill, which may not be 100 percent accurate. Under this
approach, an already accepted risk would simply be deferred.
To this extent, the practical effect of the court's opinion will depend,
at least partly, on how the General Assembly chooses to respond to it.
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Conclusion
In view of these considerations, there is reason for deep dissatis-
faction with the supreme court's opinion. Although the practical effect
of its theoretical deficiencies could easily be exaggerated, it seems fair to
conclude that, overall, the practical disadvantages may still be consider-
able. Although the General Assembly can minimize the threat to its own
aspirations, the conscientious practitioner is still relegated, on occasion, to
examining a hodgepodge of live and dead session laws. Besides, the
uncompiled laws that Superbill purported to repeal as dead or otherwise
obsolete still clutter the legislative landscape.
If there were compensating advantages (apparently there are none),
the price might be worth paying. As it is, the result will always lie in the
shadow of the possibility that had the court deferred consideration of
the issue until it could have been resolved under conditions more favorable
to full and balanced consideration, the full value of Superbill might have
been preserved without compromising the court's evaluation of Public
Law 155.
The fascinating question remains: What induced the supreme court
to take an approach to Superbill that not only involved extraordinary
theoretical difficulties but makes functional sense only if it is henceforth
disregarded? In the meantime the General Assembly has the unhappy
alternative of choosing between writing off Superbill as a dead loss or of
treating the court's opinion as if it had never been written. If, as seems
not only plausible but inevitable, it chooses the latter course (which the
decision itself tends to invite), it will have to make sure that Superbill
is treated as official and, at least for its own use, kept up to date." While
the General Assembly takes care of its own housekeeping, someone will
have to look after the needs of the practitioner. Presumably, there will
eventually be a thoroughly revised Burns. Eventually, too, there may
even have to be a constitutional amendment.4 "
In the meantime, there will be all those source laws.
45. And adequately indexed. At present writing, Superbill lacks an index. Its useful-
ness is thus seriously impaired.
46. The first step was taken in House Joint Resolution 4, concurred in by the
Senate on February 10, 1972.
